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WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE TRIANGLE OF STATE, LAW,
AND RELIGION: A COMPARISON OF EGYPT AND INDIA
Yüksel Sezgin∗
A personal status system can be defined as a system in which members of
various ethno-religious communities, which are judicially recognized as such
by central authorities, are subject to jurisdiction of communal (rather than
national or territorial) norms regarding matters such as marriage, divorce,
spousal maintenance, and inheritance.1 Such systems often feature not a
national body of family law that is uniformly applied to all citizens, but instead
a confessional system in which a Muslim is subject to Sharia, a Jew to
Halakha, and so forth.
In the past, colonial rulers employed personal status systems to
compartmentalize subjects into ethno-religious and confessional groupings,
and to distribute goods and services while denying certain populations the
benefits of full membership in the political community.2 We can understand
why colonial rulers, who often had a “divide and conquer” approach toward
their subject populations, may have employed pluri-legal personal status
systems. However, it is difficult to comprehend why such modern nation-states
as Egypt and India—both constitutionally obliged to treat their citizens equally
before the law3—would ignore their constitutional obligations and hold people
to different legal standards on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and religion by
continuing to employ old personal status systems.
Many nations that originally inherited such pluri-legal systems from their
colonial predecessors—such as Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Morocco—still
continue to employ variant forms of personal status in their legal systems.
Some scholars have considered the survival and persistence of pluri-legal

∗ Visiting Professor of Women’s Studies, Religion, and Social Sciences, Harvard Divinity School; B.A.,
Mekteb-i Mülkiye; M.A., School of Oriental and African Studies; Ph.D., University of Washington.
1 Yüksel Sezgin, A Comparative Study of Personal Status Systems in Israel, Egypt and India 1 (Int’l
Council on Hum. Rts. Pol’y, Working Paper No. 169, 1999), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/
169/135_sezgin.pdf [hereinafter Comparative Study].
2 See generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE
LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996).
3 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25,
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 40; INDIA CONST. arts. 14, 15.
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personal status systems as an anachronistic legacy of colonialism.4 According
to the proponents of the “colonial legacy” thesis, postcolonial governments,
despite their strong desire to unify their field of personal status under an
overarching network of law and courts, acquiesced to communal jurisdictions,
which had originally enjoyed autonomy under colonial rule, because they
failed to overcome the resistance of ethno-religious groups and authorities after
independence.5
However, “colonial legacy” accounts do not alone explain why personal
status systems continue to exist today; these explanations often neglect the
centrality of the state and the desire of its leaders to control and utilize personal
status as a potent tool in the process of state- and nation-building. In fact, all
postcolonial nations that inherited pluri-legal personal status systems upon
independence faced more or less the same dilemma: what were they going to
do with these fragmented systems, which were not necessarily conducive to
building a modern bureaucratic machinery or a civic sense of national identity?
Some countries opted for institutional unification (consolidating the courts of
different groups under an overarching system of national courts); some for
normative unification (abolishing different bodies of communal laws and
enacting in their place uniform territorial laws); some for both; and some for
neither.6 In the final analysis, however, countries’ choices were simultaneously
determined by their ruling elites’ ideological orientations and ability to impose
political will upon ethno-religious groups; and by the capacity of ethnoreligious groups to resist government interventions in personal status,
preserving their juridico-political autonomy.7
For example, Egypt inherited the Ottoman Millet system under which
fifteen ethno-religious communities were granted autonomy to run their own
courts and apply their own laws regarding their members’ matters of personal
status.8 The Free Officers regime, which overtook the government in 1952,9
viewed the Millet system as an undesirable legacy of “Ottoman imperialism”
4

See John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 6 (1986).
Id. at 7–8; see also M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEOCOLONIAL LAWS 454–79 (1975); Jacques Vanderlinden, Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, 28 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 149, 153 (1989).
6 Yüksel Sezgin, Legal Unification and Nation Building in the Post-Colonial World: A Comparison of
Israel and India, 8 J. COMP. ASIAN DEV. 273, 275–76 (2009).
7 Id. at 276.
8 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 8.
9 Paul S. Rowe, Neo-Millet Systems and Transnational Religious Movements: The Humayun Decrees
and Church Construction in Egypt, 49 J. CHURCH & ST. 329, 334 (2007).
5
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and extra-territoriality, which they thought had to be eliminated to attain full
sovereignty.10 Moreover, like the post-1966 military rulers of Nigeria, who
abolished the customary courts and reorganized them under the umbrella of the
Ministry of Justice,11 the Free Officers were primarily concerned with the
inefficiency, inconsistency, and prohibitive cost of religious jurisdictions and
resolved to put an end to this “juridical anarchy” through institutional
unification.12 As a result, in September 1955, the Nasserite regime enacted
Law No. 462 abolishing all religious courts in the country, including Sharia
courts, and unifying them under an overarching network of national courts.13 In
the process, the government effectively co-opted and neutralized the
opposition of ulama and clergy, who were directly affected by abolition of
religious courts, and assured the long-term success of its reform.14 As a result,
“secularly-trained” judges at civil courts, specialized family courts since
October 2004, continue to apply different bodies of religious laws to
individuals with different ethno-religious backgrounds.15 For example, when a
Muslim Egyptian comes to the Family Court, the judge will decide the case
according to Islamic law (statutory laws and Hanafi jurisprudence where the
law is silent). Similarly, when a Coptic Orthodox Egyptian resorts to the court,
the judge will apply the 1938 Coptic Orthodox Personal Status Ordinance,
provided that the application of non-Muslim law will not violate Egyptian
public policy essentially defined in reference to Sharia.
India inherited a very similar personal status system upon independence.
Thanks to British colonial rule, the country’s personal status system was
already institutionally unified as of 1947; secular judges at civil courts applied
different personal laws, such as Muslim, Hindu, and Christian laws.16
However, post-1947 Indian leaders (most prominently Prime Minister Nehru
and Law Minister Ambedkar) deemed the colonial practice of personal status
as the main culprit that nurtured communalist sentiments and prevented the
people of India from attaining a common sense of unity.17 Hence, they
believed, if India had to be one composite nation under the law, that the
10

See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 8–9.
E.I. Nwogugu, Abolition of Customary Courts—The Nigerian Experiment, 20 J. AFR. L. 1, 1–2 (1976);
see also A.O. Obilade, Reform of Customary Court Systems in Nigeria Under the Military Government, 13 J.
AFR. L. 28, 30–40 (1969).
12 Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 9.
13 Id. at 8.
14 Id. at 9.
15 See id. at 8.
16 Id. at 9.
17 See id.
11
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archaic system of personal law had to be abolished and replaced with a secular
uniform civil code (“UCC”) applicable to all citizens irrespective of caste or
religion.18 Consequently, this desire of the founding elite was embodied in
Article 44 of the 1950 Constitution.19 However, having failed to surmount the
muscular opposition of religious minorities (especially the Muslim
community), Indian leaders completely gave up on their dream of a UCC,
instead implementing a limited version of the normative unification originally
envisaged by the framers.20 They unified the law for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists,
and Jains through the 1955 and 1956 Hindu code bill reforms,21 reluctantly
agreeing to the continuance of separate personal laws for Muslims, Christians,
and Zoroastrian Parsis.22 As a result, Indian civil courts (and specialized family
courts, where available) continue to apply different religious laws to people
with different ethno-religious backgrounds.23 Currently Sikhs, Buddhists, and
Jains are treated as “Hindus” for purposes of personal law—the only
distinction from the pre-1947 period.24 Thus, when a person professing any of
these religions comes to court, the judge will apply to his case the statutory
Hindu law as codified by the parliament in 1955 and 1956, while applying to
non-“Hindus” their own communal laws.
Despite different regime and reform choices, Egypt and India share similar
personal status systems. However, it would be incorrect to analyze Egyptian
and Indian personal status systems solely from a state- or nation-building
angle, and completely ignore the systems’ impact on fundamental rights and
liberties of individuals, particularly women, who live under these systems. For
a Coptic woman who needs to change her denomination to divorce her
husband in Egypt, or for a Muslim woman in India ripped of her legal
entitlements to maintenance by an unholy alliance between self-proclaimed
leaders of her community and the Hindu government, personal status is not just
an instrument of nation-building or judicial consolidation but a matter of rights
18

Id.
INDIA CONST. art. 44 (“The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code
throughout the territory of India.”).
20 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 10.
21 The Hindu Marriage Act, No. 25 of 1955, INDIA CODE (1955), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.
asp?tfnm=195525; The Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1956), http://indiacode.nic.in/
fullact1.asp?tfnm=195630; The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, No. 32 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1956),
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195632; The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, No. 78 of 1956,
INDIA CODE (1956), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195678.
22 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 10.
23 See id.
24 See id.
19
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and liberties. With this in mind, this Essay addresses the following two
questions: (1) how do Egyptian and Indian personal status systems affect the
rights and freedoms of women who are subject to their purview?; and (2) what
strategies and tactics do women use to claim rights and liberties that are
unrecognized or encroached upon by the Egyptian and Indian personal status
laws?
The main premise of this Essay is that personal status laws, whether based
on Muslim, Jewish, or Hindu tradition, are men-made (implying that no
females were involved in this process), socio-political constructions that have
come invariably to discriminate against women and deny them equal rights in
familial relations. However, women do not silently acquiesce in violation of
their rights and liberties by male-dominated religious norms and institutions.
On the contrary, women-led hermeneutic communities all over the world are
spearheading a silent but steady revolution that redefines women’s role as
rights-bearing and equal individuals in familial and public space. In doing so,
women’s groups contest the scriptural monopoly of state-sanctioned religious
institutions, reinterpret religious laws, and reinvent the tradition by
vernacularizing international human rights and womens’ discourses. Against
this background, Part I of this Essay demonstrates the implications of personal
status laws on the rights and freedoms of women by looking at the Egyptian
and Indian personal status systems. Part II of this Essay traces women-led
reform movements emerging in the last two decades in these two countries and
demonstrates how Egyptian and Indian women have claimed the rights and
freedoms that current systems have denied them by forming reinterpretive
hermeneutic communities.
I. HOW DO MUSLIM PERSONAL STATUS LAWS AFFECT WOMEN’S RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS?
Whether done in the colonial or postcolonial era, restructuring personal
status systems has always been a project dominated by men, both in the center
and on the periphery. Women’s voices and inputs were rarely sought and
almost never taken into consideration as men continuously negotiated among
themselves rules pertaining to familial issues, such as marriage, divorce, and
maintenance.25 Men “played god” by interpreting his commands in the holy

25 ASMA BARLAS, “BELIEVING WOMEN” IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIARCHAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
QUR’ĀN 94–95 (2002); JUDITH E. TUCKER, WOMEN, FAMILY, AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAW 30–31 (2008);
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scripture regarding what was required of a woman to release her from the bond
of marriage, when a woman could be declared a disobedient wife and her
husband could deny her maintenance, and how many days a woman must wait
following her divorce before she makes herself available to another man.
Personal status systems have always been manipulated to preserve traditional
male privileges by institutionalizing discriminatory characteristics and genderunequal interpretations of major religious traditions. Thus, all personal status
systems, whether based on Muslim, Jewish, or Hindu laws, constructed
through androcentric readings of sacred texts and traditions, have come to
discriminate heavily against women in familial matters such as marriage and
divorce.
However, one should not conclude that there is an inevitable and
irreconcilable conflict between religion and women’s rights and liberties. The
central premise of this Essay is that personal status laws are not inviolable or
sacrosanct laws in their own right but socio-political constructions built
through selective interpretations of sacred texts, narratives, and traditions.
These laws were not carved in stone by God, but are laws made based on male
interpretation of what God may have meant by a particular verse, word, or
phrase in the holy scripture.26 By virtue of being men-made, religiously
inspired laws are open to constant reinterpretation and amendment. As
demonstrated below, some human rights and womens’ groups in Egypt and
India constantly challenge the legitimacy of state-sanctioned personal status
laws by offering enlightened, emancipatory, and women-friendly
interpretations of classical texts, narratives, and customs—in some cases
successfully reforming the system internally.
Although nearly all personal status laws (e.g., Jewish, Hindu, and
Christian) discriminate against women, this Essay focuses exclusively on
Muslim personal status laws in Egypt and India as they are interpreted and
applied by male-dominated secular and religious institutions. Most Muslims
believe and many scholars of contemporary Islam now accept that when Islam
was first revealed in the seventh century, it significantly advanced women’s
status by granting them revolutionary rights and freedoms that had not
previously existed in Arabian society.27 However, patriarchal interpretations of

AMINA WADUD, QUR’AN AND WOMAN: REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM A WOMAN’S PERSPECTIVE, at xi
(Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1992).
26 BARLAS, supra note 25, at 2.
27 See id. at 14.
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Muslim law and persistence of pre-Islamic tribal customs later caused this
egalitarian tradition to become a patriarchal legal system that denied women
equal rights in familial relations.28 Rules pertaining to divorce are especially
demonstrative of women’s subordination under Muslim family laws.29 With
this in mind, Part I.A addresses how Muslim personal status laws in Egypt and
India affect women’s rights by focusing on intricacies of divorce and other
aspects of breakdown of the family union such as postnuptial maintenance.
Part I.B then explores specific strategies Muslim women have devised to
empower themselves and respond to encroachments of their rights under the
religious law.
A. Egyptian Women and the Predicament of Divorce
All Muslim citizens of Egypt are subject to mandatory jurisdiction of
Sharia law for matters of personal status.30 Non-Muslims are subject to their
own communal laws only if both spouses belong to the same sect (ta’ifa) and
rite (milla); otherwise, Sharia law is applicable to them.31 Under Sharia law, a
Muslim man has a right to a unilateral, no-fault, extra-judicial divorce
(Talaq).32 A husband, who can have up to four wives,33 can divorce his wife
anytime for any reason without a need to appear before a court, by
pronouncing “Talaq” three times.34
A Muslim woman, on the other hand, has truncated rights to “judicial”
divorce (Faskh), through which she can ask the court to dissolve the marriage
on grounds of harm or injury (darar).35 For example, if darar to the wife by
the husband is satisfactorily established, under certain conditions, such as the
28 See id. at 203; WADUD, supra note 25, at 80–82. See generally FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE
MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., AddisonWesley Publ’g Co. 1991) (1987).
29 See generally TUCKER, supra note 25, at 84–132.
30 See INCORPORATING SHARIA INTO LEGAL SYSTEMS, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7235357.
stm (last updated Feb. 8, 2008, 7:36 PM).
31 Aznan Hasan, Granting Khul‘ for a Non-Muslim Couple in Egyptian Personal Status Law: Generosity
or Laxity?, 18 ARAB L.Q. 81, 81 (2003) (citing Law No. 462 of 1955 (Dissolution of the Sharia and
Confessional Courts and Transfer the Complaints that Would be Heard Before them to the National Courts),
Al-Waqai al-Misriyah, 21 Sept. 2003 (Egypt)).
32 TUCKER, supra note 25, at 86.
33 ORZALA ASHRAF NEMAT, HEINRICH BÖLL FOUND., COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FAMILY LAW IN THE
CONTEXT OF ISLAM 12 (2006), available at http://www.boell-afghanistan.org/downloads/English_Family_
Law.pdf.
34 See Valerie M. Hudson & Patricia Leidl, The Arab Intifada and Women’s Rights, WORLD POL. REV.
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7749/the-arab-intifada-and-womens-rights.
35 See TUCKER, supra note 25, at 92–95.
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husband’s sexual incompetence or his prolonged absence or imprisonment, the
judge may dissolve the marriage at the wife’s request.36 However, unlike
Talaq, Faskh is a painful and costly process. It takes eight to ten years on
average for a woman to obtain a judicial divorce.37 Egyptian women’s divorce
predicament was somewhat eased with the enactment of Law No. 1 in 2000.38
Under this law a woman can initiate a “no-fault” divorce (Khul) that does not
require the husband’s consent, provided that she forgoes all financial claims
upon him including maintenance (nafaqa) and the deferred dowry (mu’akhar
saddaq) normally paid at divorce and provided that she returns the prompt
dowry (Mahr al-muajjal) given to her at the time of the marriage (nikah).39
Whether Law No. 1 has been able to fully remedy the Egyptian women’s
predicament is discussed and answered at greater detail below. However, Law
No. 1 has seemingly opened the door to no-fault divorce for an unlikely
beneficiary: the Coptic Orthodox women who can now seek Khul divorce
under Islamic law.
Personal status matters of Copts are subject to the jurisdiction of civil
courts, which apply the 1938 ordinance single-handedly promulgated by the
liberal-minded laity without much input from the clergy.40 The ordinance,
which had a very liberal attitude toward divorce, allowed divorce on nine
different grounds41 including spousal incompatibility.42 However, the Coptic
Church has repeatedly denounced the ordinance’s liberal attitude and failed to
recognize divorce decrees granted by civil courts for any reason other than
36

See id.
See, e.g., Diane Singerman, Rewriting Divorce in Egypt: Reclaiming Islam, Legal Activism, and
Coalition Politics, in REMAKING MUSLIM POLITICS: PLURALISM, CONTESTATION, DEMOCRATIZATION 161, 165
(Robert W. Hefner ed., 2005).
38 Hasan, supra note 31, at 82.
39 See TUCKER, supra note 25, at 95–100; Hasan, supra note 31, at 82; Gabriel Sawma, The Khul’
Islamic Divorce in Egypt, MUSLIM CORNER (June 3, 2011), http://www.themuslimcorner.com/sunnah/thekhul-islamic-divorce-in-egypt.
40 Ron Shaham, Communal Identity, Political Islam and Family Law: Copts and the Debate over the
Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage in Twentieth-Century Egypt, 21 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL. 409,
409 (2010).
41 These grounds for divorce include: (1) adultery; (2) one spouse’s conversion to another religion; (3)
five-year absence with no news of the spouse’s whereabouts; (4) imprisonment for seven years or more; (5)
mental illness lasting more than three years with no hope of cure, a contagious disease that threatens the
partner’s health, or a husband’s sexual impotence over a period of three years; (6) domestic violence; (7)
immoral or incorrigible behavior (e.g., homosexuality); (8) spousal incompatibility lasting over three years;
and (9) joining a monastic order. Adel Guindy, Family Status Issues Among Egypt’s Copts: A Brief Overview,
MIDDLE E. REV. INT’L AFF., Sept. 2007, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue3/jv11no3a1.html.
42 See Shaham, supra note 40, at 418 (noting that “a deep-rooted hostility between” spouses can be
grounds for divorce).
37
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adultery.43 The normative discrepancy between the church’s views and the
views of the 1938 ordinance on divorce created a legal limbo for nearly 50,000
Copts, whose marriages courts dissolved on grounds other than adultery.44
These people are practically banned from remarriage because, in the eyes of
the church, they are still married.45 To avoid the likelihood of such a marriage
ban, couples seeking divorce must engage both ecclesiastical and civil
authorities at once. This is a painstakingly long and complicated process.
It is even more difficult and expensive for Coptic women, who must
overcome judges’ unsympathetic minds and patriarchal attitudes. To ease their
predicament, some Coptic women resort to a backdoor approach, Khul
divorces, by exploiting the loophole that allows application of Sharia to nonMuslims. For example, Hala Sidqi, a famous actress, divorced her husband in
2002 through Khul.46 In order to obtain a Khul divorce under Sharia, she had to
belong to a church other than her husband’s;47 she migrated to the Syriac
Church (Syrian Orthodox), while her husband remained a Copt.48 By doing so,
she was able not only to get a divorce under Sharia law, but also to obtain
permission to remarry in her new church.49 The exact number of Coptic
women who followed in Sidqi’s footsteps and applied for a Khul divorce
remains unknown. But, as observers indicate, not many Christian women have
been granted Khul, as Egyptian judges remain deeply divided over whether
non-Muslims should be able to obtain Khul divorces by resorting to deceitful
conversions.50 According to Mariz Tadros, a female Coptic Orthodox scholar,
although it is debatable whether Khul is a feasible option for Coptic women,
the very existence of this approach has unmistakably strengthened the
bargaining position of Coptic women vis-à-vis their husbands and communal
institutions, because they now may threaten to migrate to another church to get
43 See Amira Ibrahim, Hope on the Horizon?, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 11–17, 1999, http://
weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/420/fe1.htm (describing the Coptic Church’s efforts to restrict legal justifications
for divorce to a more limited definition of adultery).
44 Id.
45 See id.
46 Egyptian Christian Actress Granted Divorce Under Islamic Law After 10-year Court Battle,
ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN NEWS (Mar. 30, 2002), http://www.orthodoxnews.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
worldnews.one&content_id=11362&CFID=48154697&CFTOKEN=13787379&tp_preview=true. Both Sidqi
and her husband were Orthodox Copts. Id.
47 See id.
48 Id.
49 See Gamel Nkrumah, Church Weddings, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 27–Apr. 2, 2008, http://
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/890/eg3.htm.
50 Interview with Mohamed Hamed El-Gamal, Former President, Maglis Al-Dawla [Council of State], in
Cairo, Egypt (Apr. 14, 2004).
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a divorce.51 If migrating to obtain Khul divorces does not work, Coptic women
may always resort to a more drastic measure: conversion to Islam. The moment
they convert to Islam, the marriage to a Christian husband is null and void
(batil), as Sharia does not allow Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men.
B. “Triple Talaq” and Maintenance in India
Muslim personal law, heavily influenced by principles of English common
law, local customs, and Islamic law and jurisprudence, governs family matters
of Indian Muslims.52 As in Egypt, secularly trained judges at civil courts apply
Muslim personal law in India.53 However, unlike in Egypt, an Indian judge
who applies the Muslim law may be a non-Muslim, most likely a Hindu.
Another important difference is that application of religious laws in India is not
mandatory, but consensual.54 India, which claims to be a socialist, secular, and
democratic republic,55 gives its citizens who do not want to be subject to
religious laws an option to wed civilly and divorce under the Special Marriage
Act (“SMA”)56 43 of 1954.57 In practice, however, the SMA remains
ineffective legislation because most Indians are either unaware of it or are
hesitant to use it due to socio-cultural dispositions and institutional
limitations.58
Like Egyptian Muslim women, Indian Muslim women suffer most from the
husband’s right to unilateral extrajudicial divorce under the current system. In
the Indian context, however, the specific problem is “triple Talaq,” or divorce
by uttering “Talaq” thrice in a single sitting.59 Despite the urgency of the
problem of triple Talaq, Muslim women’s groups in India have focused their
attention on issues of spousal maintenance, especially since the Shah Bano

51
52
53
54

Interview with Mariz Tadros, University of Oxford, in Cairo, Egypt (Apr. 18, 2004).
See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 9.
Id.
TAHIR MAHMOOD, INDIAN LAW INST., CIVIL MARRIAGE LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 11

(1978).
55

INDIA CONST. pmbl., amended by The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976.
The Special Marriage Act, No. 43 of 1954, INDIA CODE (1954), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?
tfnm=195443.
57 MAHMOOD, supra note 54, at 11–12.
58 Id. at 51–55; see also PERVEEZ MODY, THE INTIMATE STATE: LOVE-MARRIAGE AND THE LAW IN
DELHI 129–34 (2008).
59 Karen Leslie Hernandez-Andrews, Talaq, Talaq, Talaq—Women Suffering in India Because of the
Misuse of Triple Talaq (May 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wunrn.com/news/
2006/07_03_06/070906_india_triple.htm.
56
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judgment of the Indian Supreme Court in 1985,60 and mostly shied away from
dealing with issues of marriage and divorce. In minority settings, where issues
of marriage and divorce are intricately entangled with identity politics as in
India, women’s rights groups tend to deal with procedural and less
controversial issues, such as maintenance, through legislative or judicial
channels, while refraining from addressing substantive issues of marriage and
divorce in majority institutions such as courts or legislative bodies. If
controversial issues of marriages and divorce are ever addressed, they are
usually addressed within the community through hermeneutic means, as
demonstrated below.
According to Sharia law in India, in the event of divorce, the husband must
pay his wife the deferred part of her Mahr and provide her with maintenance
(nafaqa) during the three-month waiting period following the divorce, which
may last until the end of pregnancy if the wife is expecting (iddat). Otherwise,
the husband has no further financial obligations toward his wife. Even though
Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 requires all Indian
husbands to continue providing for their divorcées who are destitute and
unable to maintain themselves,61 Muslim men were excluded from the purview
of Section 125 by virtue of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in
Divorce) Act (“MWA”) of 1986.62 The MWA limited the Muslim husband’s
postnuptial maintenance obligation to the iddat period.63 With the enactment of
the MWA, the Indian government openly discriminated against Muslim
women and denied them financial guarantees that it bestowed upon Hindu,
Parsi, and Christian women. As shown below, despite their recent successes in
the battle over maintenance, Indian Muslim women continue their struggle to
end gender discrimination and injustices perpetrated by religious and secular
laws and secure their right to “a reasonable and fair provision,” which is
increasingly under attack by communal forces.

60 Khan v. Begum (Shah Bano), (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India), http://indiankanoon.org/doc/823221. See
generally Nawaz B. Mody, The Press in India: The Shah Bano Judgment and Its Aftermath, 27 ASIAN SURV.
935 (1987).
61 The Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 2 of 1974, § 125, CODE CRIM. PROC. (1974), http://
indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=197402.
62 The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986, § 5, INDIA CODE (1986),
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=198625.
63 See id. § 4.

SEZGIN GALLEYSFINAL2

1018

11/18/2011 10:01 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

II. HOW DO WOMEN CLAIM THE RIGHTS DENIED THEM BY PERSONAL STATUS
LAWS?
Muslim personal status laws in both Egypt and India are detrimental to the
rights and freedoms of women. This is because neither government has proved
able or willing to reform their personal status systems, and both failed to
protect women against encroachments of religious norms and authorities.
Nevertheless, neither Egyptian nor Indian Muslim women silently accept
violation of their fundamental rights under state-sanctified personal status
laws. These women are fighting back fiercely to advance their rights and
freedoms. In doing so, they challenge the hegemonic narratives of gender and
subjectivity and redefine their roles as rights-bearing individuals and equal
citizens in the familial and public space.
In these religious systems, where women are systematically denied their
fundamental rights in the name of obeying God’s orders, the discussion
revolves around the question of whose interpretation of the Holy Quran or
Hadith is authoritative. Hence, it is not surprising to see that in both countries
women increasingly respond to violations of their rights by forming
hermeneutic communities that challenge official interpretations of religious
precepts and offer alternative women-friendly readings of law hoping to
advance their rights and reform the system internally. In the process, to
identify and remove disabilities and women’s rights violations, hermeneutic
communities engage in an An-Na’imian “internal discourse” through
enlightened interpretations of cultural values and norms.64 However,
hermeneutic groups are not only agents who solely engage in internal scriptural
activity, but also interlocutors who participate in cross-cultural dialogues on a
global level from which they draw intellectual inspiration, resources, and
moral authority. These dialogues guide the hermeneutic groups in locating and
retrospectively constructing cultural references and narratives that promote a
particular vision and set of rights. This is the very process that Peggy Levitt
and Sally Engle Merry refer to as “vernacularization” through which
hermeneutic communities translate global women’s rights discourses and

64 See generally, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining
International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 19, 19–43
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im ed., 1991).
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practices by meticulously grafting them onto culture, tradition, religious
beliefs, and teachings of their own societies.65
Hermeneutic communities usually adopt moderate means and strive for
incremental change by working within current institutions. They may build
cross-communal alliances, lobby for judicial and legislative change, mobilize
courts, educate the public, and seek behavioral change by framing gender
issues in terms that resonate with the dominant religio-legal culture.66
However, as governments and religious authorities repeatedly fail to respond to
calls for reform, some disillusioned groups may completely cease to use staterun personal status institutions and steadily evolve into “self-ruling”
communities by setting up their own judicial bodies that apply their own
version of law to members of their self-proclaimed communities. The All India
Muslim Women Personal Law Board (“AIMWPLB”), after long years of
dissatisfaction with the version of Sharia promoted by the male-dominated All
India Muslim Personal Law Board (“AIMPLB”) and secular state courts, set
up a women’s Sharia court (mahila adalat) in Lucknow to offer religiously
acceptable solutions to problems like triple Talaq, implementing an
enlightened and egalitarian interpretation of Islamic law. Against this
backdrop, this Part looks at activities of hermeneutic and rule-making
communities in Egypt and India and illustrates strategies and tactics
successfully employed by these groups to advance women’s rights under
Muslim personal status laws.
A. Khul Law: Egyptian Muslim Women Redefining Sharia
Hermeneutic communities have been particularly active in Egypt, where
top-down approaches to reform have failed and the women’s rights regressed,
especially since a 1985 decision of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court
striking down Law No. 44 of 1979 as unconstitutional.67 Law No. 44 stipulated
that taking a second wife without the consent of the first wife constituted an
darar to the first wife and therefore entitled her to seek divorce from the

65 See generally Peggy Levitt & Sally Engle Merry, Unpacking the Vernacularization Process: The
Transnational Circulation of Women’s Human Rights (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
66 See id. (manuscript at 3–4).
67 Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12.
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court.68 This law was unconstitutionally promulgated by a presidential decree,
but was a quantum leap in women’s right to divorce.69 It did not take long for
opponents of the law, who viewed it in violation of Sharia for curbing Muslim
men’s “god-given” right to polygyny, to launch a judicial onslaught to stop its
implementation. In May 1985, their efforts finally came to fruition when the
court declared Law No. 44 unconstitutional on technical grounds.70 Two
months later, the parliament hastily put together a revised law (Law No. 100)
to replace and eliminate the controversial provision of Law No. 44 that
“considered a second marriage by the husband as ipso facto a cause of harm to
the first wife” and grounds for divorce.71
The failure of the 1979 law taught invaluable lessons to Egyptian women’s
rights groups that wanted to reform the personal status laws. First, the reform
had to be initiated by the women themselves through a combination of
grassroots mobilization and government support, rather than for the women
through unpopular top-down processes.72 Second, any change in the law had to
be firmly rooted in historical sources and Sharia traditions.73 As evidenced by
Law No. 44, a solely liberal or secular approach would backfire and do more
harm than good to the Egyptian womens’ cause. As one prominent feminist put
it, Egyptian women’s groups throughout the 1990s adopted the “strategy of
engaging religious discourse, based on the women’s reading of their rights
under the principles of Sharia.”74 Hence, the setback experienced in 1985 led
various women’s groups to act collectively and campaign for equal rights for
women in personal status by utilizing an Islamic framework.
During the next two decades, women’s groups devoted their energy
primarily to the Khul law. As noted above, the new law allowed a woman to
initiate a no-fault divorce without the consent of her husband, provided she
renounced her pecuniary claims against him and returned the prompt dowry

68 Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron with Baudouin Dupret, Breaking up the Family: Divorce in Egyptian Law
and Practice, 6 HAWWA: J. WOMEN MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC WORLD 52, 56 (2008) [hereinafter Breaking up the
Family].
69 See id. at 56–57; Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12. The “decree-law procedure,” used to pass
Law No. 44, was improperly used because this was not an “urgent matter.” Breaking up the Family, supra note
68, at 57.
70 Breaking up the Family, supra note 68, at 56–57; Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12.
71 Fauzi M. Najjar, Egypt’s Laws of Personal Status, 10 ARAB STUD. Q. 319, 341 (1988).
72 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12.
73 Id.
74 Singerman, supra note 37, at 161 (quoting Mona Zulficar, The Islamic Marriage Contract in Egypt
(Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)).
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she received at the time of nikah.75 Throughout the process that culminated in
the enactment of Law No. 1, women’s groups worked directly with
government officials, lobbied members of parliament, and consulted with
members of ulama at al-Azhar. As Professor Zeinab Redwan, a female
member of the Egyptian Parliament and one of the architects of the reform
noted, “[during the entire process] women repeatedly resorted to the Islamic
rhetoric and built their case around a hadith that reported Prophet Muhammad
allowing a woman to divorce her husband by returning the orchard that she had
received as dowry.”76
Critics argued that the Sharia had required the consent of the husband to
divorce even in the case of Khul. Opponents also added that the law was only
meant for rich women, as the poor could not afford to forgo their rights to
maintenance and deferred dowry, nor could they pay back the prompt dowry.77
However, recent evidence shows that an increasing number of middle and
lower class women are taking advantage of Khul, because its actual cost has
not been as high as was claimed by the critics of Law No. 1.78 With this in
mind, most problems that women encounter are social and institutional in
nature. Public opinion surveys point out that most Egyptians consider Khul as
an option to be taken only by Westernized women.79 In popular culture, such
as movies and cartoons, the women who resort to Khul are often depicted as
immoral persons in Westernized garments who divorce their husbands for
frivolous reasons just to run to the arms of their secret lovers.80 In the early
years of the reform, these negative images were also widespread among
personal status court judges.81 In fact, some attribute the discrepancy82 between

75

See supra Part I.A.
Interview with Zeinab Radwan, Member, Shariah Council, Dean, Cairo University’s Dar Al-Ulum, in
Cairo, Egypt (May 14, 2004).
77 Hala Sakr & Mohamed Hakim, One Law for All, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 1–7, 2001, http://
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/523/sc1k.htm.
78 Nadia Sonneveld, Reinterpretation of Khul‘ in Egypt: Intellectual Disputes, the Practice of the Courts,
and Everyday Life (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Leiden University) (on file with author).
79 See Fayza Hassan, The Meaning of Emancipation, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 1–7, 2001, http://
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/523/sc1.htm; Nadia Sonneveld, If Only There Was Khul‘ . . ., 17 ISIM REV. 50, 50–
51 (2006).
80 See generally, e.g., Sonneveld, supra note 79.
81 Singerman, supra note 37, at 181–82.
82 For example, in the Cairo Governorate, only 4.5% of the khul‘ applications filed between March 2000
and March 2001 were actually ruled on by the personal status courts. Azza Soliman & Azza Salah, The Legal
Aspects of Khol‘ and Its Application, in THE HARVEST: TWO YEARS AFTER KHOL‘ 19–20 (Seham Abd el
Salam trans., 2003), available at http://www.cewla.org/admin/issues/download/14.rar?PHPSESSID=51b2a8d9
a12115a33ff3f4ee7390cc72. For the same period, in the Giza Governorate, the rate was 6.9%. Id. at 21–22.
76
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the number of Khul petitions filed and the actual number of divorces granted
by the courts to the unwillingness and obstructive practices of the judges and
other court officials.83 During the first three years of the law, out of nearly
210,000 divorces granted by the Egyptian judges, only about 5,000 were Khul
divorces.84
B. Impact Litigation and the Rise of Islamic Feminism in India
Indian women’s organizations, including mainstream Muslim women’s
groups, have historically adopted a secularist approach toward the issue of
reform in personal law:
Towards Equality, the report of the National Committee on the Status
of Women, said:
The absence of a UCC in the last quarter of the twentieth
century . . . is an incongruity that cannot be justified with all
the emphasis that is placed on secularism, science and
modernism. The continuance of various personal laws which
accept discrimination between men and women violates the
85
fundamental rights.

Since the 1950s, Indian feminists generally have believed that social uplifting
of women could only be achieved through replacement of religious laws with a
secular UCC. However, ideological transformations since the mid-1980s, the
rise of communal violence, and the appropriation of the concept of the UCC by
right-wing Hindu platforms (e.g., Sangh Parivar and Bharatiya Janata Party)
have forced the women’s organizations to reconsider their strategies and drop
their earlier calls for a UCC.86 In this new environment, a UCC has ceased to
symbolize the advancement of women’s rights and become a weapon in the
hands of racist and sexist groups. As Syeda Hamid, the President of the
83 Mulki Al-Sharmani, Egyptian Family Courts: A Pathway of Women’s Empowerment?, 7 HAWWA: J.
WOMEN MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC WORLD 89, 101–03 (2009).
84 See Divorce Statistics, CENT. AGENCY FOR PUB. MOBILIZATION & STAT., http://msrintranet.capmas.
gov.eg/pls/census/spart_all_e?lname=FREE&lang=0 (last visited Aug. 19, 2011). The statistics agency does
not provide any information on the number of Khul divorces awarded by the courts. Unfortunately, nearly all
information provided on the number of Khul divorces relies upon anecdotal evidence offered by judges,
lawyers, and activists.
85 Nivedita Menon, Women and Citizenship, in WAGES OF FREEDOM: FIFTY YEARS OF THE INDIAN
NATION-STATE 241, 244 (Partha Chatterjee ed., 1998) (quoting MINISTRY OF EDUC. & SOC. WELFARE, INDIA
DEP’T OF SOC. WELFARE, TOWARDS EQUALITY: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN
INDIA 142 (1974)).
86 Flavia Agnes, Constitutional Challenges, Communal Hues and Reforms Within Personal Laws,
COMBAT L. (Mumbai), Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 4, 5–6.
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Muslim Women’s Forum, put it, this has posed difficult ideological and ethical
dilemmas particularly to Muslim feminists:
The bottom line is that there should be a uniform law for all
citizens. . . . But of course we changed our attitude and
policy. . . . We had to. . . . When the community is battered you keep
your silence. How you can talk about reform when you are being
killed. . . ? How you can use the same language [UCC] with the
people who are battering you [right-wing Hindus]. . . ? You know
what happened in Ayodhya, you know about the pogroms and
genocide of Gujarat. . . . When the state becomes a predator . . . you
keep your silence, you do not talk about reforming the Islamic law,
because everything is about identity and everything is about
87
religion. . . .

As a result, since the 1990s Muslim women’s groups have instead relied
upon a mixture of legislative and judicial strategies and, whenever possible,
engaged in hermeneutic activities to change Muslim laws internally. For
instance, in the last two decades, Muslim women’s rights activists have put
forth quintessential examples of ways to mobilize courts to challenge and
reform gender-unequal personal status laws. In the aftermath of the infamous
MWA of 1986,88 women’s rights activists launched a campaign to defeat the
ill-famed legislation’s minimalist interpretations, which denied Muslim
women’s right to maintenance beyond the iddat period by invoking an
innocuous clause that escaped the attention of conservative groups:89 “[A]
divorced woman shall be entitled to- (a) a reasonable and fair provision and
maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period.”90 Their
campaign culminated with the Indian Supreme Court’s ruling in Danial
Latifi,91 in which the court overruled the minimalist interpretations of the
MWA, and held that the Muslim husband was required to make a lump-sum
payment to his ex-wife during the period of iddat, including not only the
nafaqa and deferred part of her Mahr, but also a “reasonable and fair
provision” that would financially secure her future well beyond iddat.92 Thanks

87 Interview with Syeda Hamid, Founder & President, Muslim Women’s Forum, in New Delhi, India
(Mar. 19, 2005).
88 See supra Part I.B.
89 Agnes, supra note 86, at 8.
90 The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986, § 3(1)(a), INDIA CODE
(1986) (emphasis added), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=198625.
91 Latifi v. Union of India (Daniel Latifi), (2001) 7 S.C.C. 740 (India), http://indiankanoon.org/doc/
410660/.
92 Id.
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to the expansionist interpretation adopted by the court, Muslim women who
resort to state courts now receive some of the highest maintenance awards in
the country.93
In post-Shah Bano India where communal tensions rose and the threat of
Hindutva groups escalated, the Muslim community has grown increasingly
insular and resistant to change in its laws. The community fell under the
control of conservative elements such as the AIMPLB. The board has set up its
own network of Sharia courts (Dar-ul Qazas) on the premise that non-Muslims
are not qualified to administer Sharia.94 This view has increasingly gained
currency in the Muslim community since the Shah Bano case in which the allHindu bench of the Indian Supreme Court practically engaged in independent
thought (ijtihad) and told Muslims how to read and interpret the Quran
correctly!95 The AIMPLB was the main architect of the MWA of 1986, which
limited women’s right to maintenance to only iddat. However, after it failed to
influence the Indian Supreme Court’s interpretation of the act in Danial Latifi,
the AIMPLB and its courts applying a male-centric version of Sharia have
sought to discourage women in the community from taking their cases to state
courts and claiming maintenance beyond the iddat. For example, the qazi of
the Delhi Sharia Court, argues:
It is the obligation of a Muslim to live according to rules of shariat.
When there is a shariat court, if one goes to civil courts and wins a
case according to rules applied by non-Muslims it will be haram or a
sin in the eyes of Allah. . . . Muslims have to come to shariat courts;
96
even if they lose, they will still be winners in the eyes of Allah.

Against this background, where communal forces prevented women from
enjoying the rights and liberties promised to them under the secular law, there
was only one option left for groups who demanded change in Muslim personal
laws: internal reform through hermeneutic means. In fact, like their Egyptian
counterparts, some Indian Muslim women’s groups have increasingly resorted

93 See generally Werner Menski, Double Benefits and Muslim Women’s Postnuptial Rights, KERALA L.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at 21.
94 Interview with Qasim Rasool Ilyas, All India Muslim Pers. Law Bd., in New Delhi, India (Mar. 8,
2005).
95 Subrata K. Mitra & Alexander Fischer, Sacred Laws and the Secular State: An Analytical Narrative of
the Controversy over Personal Laws in India, INDIA REV., July 2002, at 99, 119.
96 Interview with Mohammad Kamil Qasmi, Qazi, Delhi Shariat Court, All India Muslim Pers. Law Bd.,
in New Delhi, India (Mar. 8, 2005).
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to reinterpretative strategies to challenge the textual authority of the AIMPLB
and state courts and pushed to advance their rights under Sharia law.97
Realizing the increasing control of the AIMPLB over personal status law
and institutions, many Muslim women activists joined the board and its
decision-making bodies to draw attention to and resolve women’s issues under
the Muslim personal law. For example, to put an end to the predicament of
triple Talaq, some female members prepared a model marriage contract
(nikahnama), which allowed women to stipulate conditions in the contract such
as an option for delegated divorce (Talaq-e tawfiz), through which the husband
permits his wife to initiate divorce at her own will, and presented it to the
board for approval. However, the male-dominated board rejected it on the
claim that it was an “un-Islamic” proposal and swiftly silenced uncompliant
women’s voices throughout the organization.98 In response, in 2005, some
female members of the board split and organized in Lucknow the AIMWPLB,
representing the major sects and schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The
AIMWPLB released a new nikahnama in 2008 that consisted of seventeenpoint guidelines for marriage for bride and groom under the Islamic law
(hidayatnama) and an eight-point section on divorce process. It prohibits triple
Talaq through text messaging, email, video-conferencing, or phone, and
recognizes women’s right to delegated divorce (Talaq-e tawfiz) and Khul. The
model nikahnama also details women’s right to postmarital maintenance and
Mahr. To preempt the possible attacks of the traditional ulama on the new
nikahnama, the new marriage contract carries extensive quotes from relevant
verses of the Quran. As Shaista Amber, president of the AIMWPLB, reports,
the new nikahnama steadily gains acceptance in the community and about fifty
couples have married under the relatively gender-balanced contract.99
In addition, AIMWPLB has established its own court structure (mahila
adalat), deciding cases according to a women-friendly interpretation of Sharia.
The women’s court is located in Lucknow and convenes every Friday at a local
mosque built by Ms. Amber. It currently decides about 200 divorce cases per
year. Both male and female judges (qazis) sit together at mahila adalat. The
law applied is not substantively different from the Sharia law applied by
AIMPLB courts, but qazis at the mahila adalat implement it with an eye to
97 See generally Sylvia Vatuk, Islamic Feminism in India: Indian Muslim Women Activists and the
Reform of Muslim Personal Law, 42 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 489 (2008).
98 Noorjehan Safia Niaz, Marriage in Islam, COMBAT L. (Mumbai), Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 25, 28.
99 Telephone Interview with Shaista Amber, President, All India Muslim Women Pers. Law Bd. (May
12, 2010).
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“universal standards of human and women’s rights.”100 The Bharatiya Muslim
Mahila Andolan (“BMMA”), another organization working to secure the rights
of women through feminist and humanist interpretations of Islam, has taken
the women’s cause one step further and made history by allowing a female
qazi, Syeda Hamid, to solemnize a nikah ceremony where all four witnesses
were also women.101 While the members of the mainstream ulama questioned
whether a woman could solemnize marriage under the Islamic law, BMMA
silently broke the tradition and opened a new page for Muslim women in India
who could rely on neither the secular state nor male-dominated communal
institutions but their own initiative to end the discrimination they suffer under
Indian personal laws.
CONCLUSION
Egypt is a Muslim-majority, authoritarian state where Sharia is the
principal source of legislation. India is a Hindu-majority state with a socialist,
secular, and democratic regime. Despite differences in political orientation, for
various reasons explained above, both nations have similar personal status
systems, under which secularly trained judges at civil courts apply different
religious laws in regard to matters of family law.
Experiences of Indian and Egyptian Muslim women under the personal
status systems of the two countries seem to be strikingly similar as well. The
main problems that women suffer from under both systems are related to
gender-unequal divorce laws and postnuptial maintenance. Solutions offered
by political and judicial authorities to these problems in both countries are also
very similar. In Egypt, to ease Muslim women’s predicament of divorce,
President Sadat promulgated Law No. 44 in 1979 through unpopular top-down
means. The result was a conservative backlash. The Egyptian Supreme
Constitutional Court struck down Law No. 44 of 1979 as unconstitutional in
1985. Law No. 100, which replaced Law No. 44, reverted women rights to
divorce back to their pre-1979 state. In India, an all-Hindu bench of the India
Supreme Court tried to unilaterally expand Muslim women’s right to
maintenance by practically engaging in ijtihad and imposing its own
interpretation of Sharia upon the Muslim community. The result was another

100

Id.
Law Commission Member Hails Syeda Acting ‘Kazi’ to Solemnize ‘Nikah,’ ONEINDIA NEWS (Aug. 14,
2008),
http://news.oneindia.in/2008/08/14/law-commission-member-hails-syeda-acting-kazi-to-solemnisenikah-1218717283.html.
101

SEZGIN GALLEYSFINAL2

2011]

11/18/2011 10:01 AM

WOMEN’S RIGHTS

1027

conservative backlash. The Indian parliament enacted the MWA of 1986 to
reverse the court’s judgment and limit Muslim women’s right to maintenance
to iddat alone.
In response, Egyptian Muslim women resorted to hermeneutic means to
render women-friendly interpretations of Sharia and finally succeeded in
convincing the political authorities to enact Law No. 1 of 2000 that recognized
women’s right to Khul. This was the greatest achievement of the women’s
movement in modern Egyptian history. However, prevailing socio-cultural
dispositions and obstructive practices of some judges,102 who even called
women who made use of their “prophet-given” right to Khul whores
(sharmoota), derailed the application of the law and eclipsed its success.
Indian Muslim women’s rights activists mobilized the courts and turned the
ill-intended MWA into favorable legislation by defeating its minimalist
interpretations. Although this was a remarkable achievement for women, it
also galvanized communal forces into action that in turn effectively
discouraged and prevented Muslim women from claiming their right to
extended maintenance under the secular law. In other words, the method of
challenging Muslim laws through majority-controlled judicial channels has
proved of limited use and mostly ineffectual. Thus, the only viable option left
for Muslim minority women in India was hermeneutics. As exemplified by
AIMWPLB and BMMA, an increasing number of women’s groups engages in
feminist and liberal theology and renders emancipatory interpretations of
Sharia, and by doing so, constantly challenges the scriptural and exegetical
monopoly of male-dominated institutions and prevailing gender norms in
society.
It cannot yet be claimed that there is a full-blown feminist or theological
revolution taking place in either country. However, there is certainly a steady
and silent revolution in the making. Hermeneutic communities constantly alter
the way society understands the legality of Muslim personal status laws that
dictate women’s role in the familial and public space by deconstructing the
meaning of texts, historical narratives, and tradition. The pace of reform
introduced through hermeneutic means may be criticized as too slow. It may
also fall short of so-called universal and secular standards of women’s rights.
However, these “limited” and “gradual” changes may be more likely to affect

102 Interview with Pers. Status Court Judge, in Cairo, Egypt (June 21, 2004). The interviewee declined to
be identified.
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women’s rights in the desired direction than top-down secular remedies. This
does not mean that secular interventions are always doomed to fail.
Experiences of these two countries, however, suggest that they tend to be
rather symbolic, limited and indirect, and rarely offer a viable option,
especially to Muslim women in minority settings. Therefore, hermeneutic
activity or “reform from within” stands a better chance of acceptance and
success in the long term. However, the ultimate goal of any reform, whether
brought about through hermeneutic or secular means, should be to attain social
change by altering long-existing cultural dispositions and stereotypes about
women’s role and place in the society. Otherwise, prevailing cultural and
institutional prejudices against women will undercut reform and prevent it
from attaining its full potential.

